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A War on Civilians:1
Disaster Capitalism2 and the Drug War in Mexico
Gabrielle D. Schneck
I. INTRODUCTION
Within days of his inauguration in December 2006, Mexican President
Felipe Calderón declared “war” on organized crime. In particular, Calderón
aimed to confront the powerful cartels that control the drug trade and other
illicit industries such as human trafficking.3 Following a highly contested
election, Calderón entered office amid accusations of electoral fraud and
months of mass protest.4 In a show of strength to gain political legitimacy, he
immediately deployed over 20,000 federal troops5 under the banner of fighting
the “war on drugs.”6 Calderón’s militarized escalation of antinarcotics efforts
1

“A War on Civilians”: Mexico’s Drug War Draws Protests as Grueling Death Toll
Grows, DEMOCRACY NOW! (May 11, 2011) (quoting Molly Molloy), available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/5/11/a_war_on_civilians_mexicos_drug.
2
The term “disaster capitalism” is a phrase coined by Naomi Klein in her New York
Times bestselling book. See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF
DISASTER CAPITALISM 12 (2008).
3
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY: KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND
DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” 4 (2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
4
See JOHN GIBLER, TO DIE IN MEXICO: DISPATCHES FROM INSIDE THE DRUG WAR 61
(2011) [hereinafter TO DIE IN MEXICO].
5
See JOHN GIBLER, MEXICO UNCONQUERED: CHRONICLES OF POWER AND REVOLT 52
(2009) [hereinafter MEXICO UNCONQUERED]; CHARLES BOWDEN, MURDER CITY: CIUDAD
JUAREZ AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY’S NEW KILLING FIELDS 25 (2010).
6
Some sources place the term “war on drugs” in quotation marks when referencing
Calderón’s militarization program. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4.
Alternatively, at least one expert avoids the term altogether because the traditional concept of
war, implying adversarial militaries, is the “wrong metaphor” for this conflict. HOWARD
CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF EL PASO
AND JUÁREZ 7 (Univ. of Texas Press 2009). Unlike traditional armies, cartels are both covert
and somewhat fluid, with shifting alliances; additionally, in Mexico, they are “tightly
interwoven” with the government, their purported enemy. See id. Here, I use the term “war
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represents a dramatic shift in the Mexican government’s approach to the drug
trade, a business in which it has long been involved and from which it has long
benefitted.7 Notably, the military crackdown has not reduced the drug trade,
nor has it eased crime-related violence in Mexico.8 Instead, the violence has
intensified, and human rights violations have risen severely.9 As of January
2012, the Mexican government acknowledges that 47,515 people have died in
the drug war within the span of five years,10 and some experts contend that the
death toll is much higher than the official numbers reflect.11
Calderón’s war on drugs has had a profound and devastating impact on
Mexico, generating a climate of fear and violence that has repercussions on
nearly all levels of Mexican society.12 This article intends to critically examine
the myths used to justify the militarized approach of Mexico’s current
antinarcotic efforts by looking at the interests of its US and Mexican
supporters. My goal is to engage in a broad analysis of the drug war in the
context of other political issues such as free trade, the illicit drug industry’s
corrupting influence on law enforcement, immigration, and anti-neoliberal
social movements in Mexico in a way that is accessible to those with limited
on drugs” to reference antidrug policies of both the Mexican and US governments, but for
the sake of simplicity and consistency, I do not place the term in quotation marks hereinafter.
I use the term “drug war,” also without quotation marks hereinafter, to refer generally to
drug-related violence. I intend this latter term to encompass two overlapping sources of
violence: (1) the ongoing contest for control of the drug business among cartels, which the
state also participates in, and (2) the militarized law-enforcement operations of the war on
drugs fought by the Mexican security forces as part of the state’s antinarcotics policy. See TO
DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 26.
7
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4. See also TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note
4, at 25–29.
8
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 5.
9
Id.
10
See Mexican Drug Trafficking (Mexico’s Drug War), N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_traffic
king/index.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2012).
11
Mexico Says Drug War Death Toll Has Topped 47,000, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.democracynow.org/2012/1/12/headlines (“The Mexican census agency
has identified 67,000 homicides from 2007 through 2010, nearly double the government’s
count of drug-related deaths for that period.”).
12
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4–5.
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exposure to such issues. In doing so, my hope is to break some of the silence
surrounding Mexico’s drug war within the parameters of US political and legal
discourse and to contribute to the advancement of meaningful social change.
Broadly, the militarization of Mexico since 2006 under the umbrella of the
US-led war on drugs is best understood as a product of neoliberalism,13 and, as
such, its operations can be best understood through a critique of neoliberal
socio-economic and security programs. I contend that the increasing
militarization of Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts represents a new theater of
the disaster capitalism complex, a term coined by award-winning journalist
and author Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster
Capitalism.14 As such, the war on drugs approach is best understood by
analyzing the connections between free-market trade policies, the privatization
of the security industry, and the potential for state and economic elite actors to
capitalize on disaster-induced collective trauma.
Section I begins by reviewing the current landscape of President Calderón’s
war on drugs, including the justifications for the war offered by the Mexican
and US governments, the parameters of US drug aid, and some of the main
critiques of the war. Section II provides a broad context for analyzing
neoliberalism by looking at its characteristic economic and security programs
and connecting them with the United States’ domestic war on drugs and
immigration enforcement policies. Section III discusses neoliberalism in
Mexico, focusing on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
resistance within Mexico to free-market economic policies. Finally, Section IV
draws connections between the militarization of Mexico’s antinarcotics efforts,
the collective trauma that has been produced by the war, and the economic
elite interests that benefit from protecting neoliberal policies in Mexico.

13

Neoliberalism refers to the set of trends and ideas that have come to dominate political
discourse and practice in various areas, and it is discussed in more detail below. See LISA
DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE
ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY xi–xii (2003).
14
See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 12.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE
The current Mexican government’s antinarcotic efforts have focused on
utilizing the military to wage an assault on cartels.15 Each year, Calderón’s
administration has steadily increased the deployment of Mexican troops, from
20,000 to 30,000 initially, and eventually to 50,000.16 Mexico has seen serious
increases in human rights violations and fatalities related to the war on drugs
committed by both security forces and organized crime.17 By the end of 2007,
Calderón’s first year in office, 2,826 people had been killed in drug-related
violence,18 nearly the same number that died during the previous
administration’s entire six years in office.19 In 2008, that number almost
doubled: between 5,000 and 6,000 people were killed in the violence.20 In
2010, the death toll exploded to 15,273 in just one year.21 By November 2011,
the total number of fatalities since Calderón had taken office nearly five years
prior hovered around 45,000.22
In addition to the sheer number of deaths, patterns of egregious human
rights abuses have emerged in Mexico, committed by both the cartels and
Mexican law enforcement, particularly the military. Brutality has become a
hallmark of drug-related violence, and the systematic use of torture and forced
disappearances has surfaced.23 The Mexican security forces commonly use
beatings, asphyxiation with plastic bags, electric shocks, sexual torture, death
threats, and mock executions; these tactics are believed to be aimed at eliciting
information about organized crime.24 The prevalence of disappearances has

15

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4.
See id.; BOWDEN, supra note 6, at 25.
17
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4–6.
18
Id. at 4.
19
See MEXICO UNCONQUERED, supra note 5, at 52. Three thousand people died in drugrelated violence during the presidency of Vicente Fox from 2000 to 2006. Id.
20
See BOWDEN, supra note 5, at 17.
21
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4.
22
Id.
23
See id. at 5.
24
See id. at 5–6.
16
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increased as well, and evidence suggests that state security forces are often
involved in these events, even when officials blame organized crime for the
acts.25 The cartels, on the other hand, use the same tactics of torture, forced
disappearances, and executions in their struggle to control the channels of the
drug trade. The violence often targets competing cartels, but it also victimizes
the family members of those touched by the drug business on various levels,
including small business owners who refuse to pay extortion fees, young
people who have taken low-level jobs in the drug business, as well as
journalists, politicians, mayors, and other members of the public.26 The
military escalation under Calderón has not halted the wheels of the drug
economy. Instead, the escalation marks the moment when “the killing began to
spiral to previously unimagined levels.”27
Shortly after entering office, President Calderón began talks with the United
States about funding the increased militarization of Mexico’s drug war. These
talks produced the Mérida Initiative,28 committing USD $1.5 billion to Mexico
and Central America between 2008 and 2010,29 with $1.3 billion going to
25

See id. at 5–6, 125.
See generally EL SICARIO: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN ASSASSIN 18–20, 26,
116 (Molly Molloy & Charles Bowden eds., Molly Molloy trans., 2011) [hereinafter EL
SICARIO]. EL SICARIO is the story of a former paid assassin from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico,
who worked in the drug industry for both the cartels and law enforcement, often at the same
time. Id. at 73–74. His account details the use of torture and murder by both the cartels and
the state, the corruption of the Mexican government, and the enormous profits that continue
to be made by both the cartels and the state through the drug trade. See, e.g., id. at 11–12,
80–81, 125–26. He fled from this life in 2007. Id. at 17. He lives in the United States in selfexile, and his identity remains anonymous. See id. at xii, 4. The word “sicario,” in this
context, refers generally to the individuals and groups hired by Mexican cartels as enforcers.
COLLEEN W. COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34215, MEXICO’S DRUG CARTELS 6
(2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf.
27
BOWDEN, supra note 5, at 25.
28
The agreement was initially known as Plan Mexico, but the name was probably changed
due to its parallels with Plan Colombia, which is briefly discussed later. See Daniela Morales
& Peter Watt, Narcotrafficking in Mexico: Neoliberalism and a Militarized State, UPSIDE
DOWN WORLD (Sept. 17, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexicoarchives-79/2696-narcotrafficking-in-mexico-neoliberalism-and-a-militarized-state.
29
Fact Sheet: The Mérida Initiative/Plan Mexico, WITNESS FOR PEACE,
http://www.witnessforpeace.org/downloads/Witness%20for%20Peace%20Fact%20Sheet_M
26
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Mexico.30 Originally negotiated by the Bush administration, President Obama
has continued to support the militarization of Mexico under the program. In
2010, he requested that Congress allocate $450 million to purchase more
equipment for the Mexican authorities.31 By January 2011, US aid to Mexico
and Central America aimed at fighting the drug industry totaled $1.7 billion.32
In August 2011, the State Department announced that the Mérida Initiative will
continue with a focus on Mexico’s northern states,33 and the Obama
administration has requested $290 million in funding for 2012.34 The aid has
been directed at providing various types of support for the Mexican security
forces, including inspection and surveillance equipment, helicopters, military
training, and technology.35 The hefty amounts of continuing aid directed at this
effort suggests that US policy makers have identified a clear interest in
furthering the militarization of Mexico’s war on drugs; it also means that the
brutal escalation of violence in recent years has been funded, at least in part, by
US taxpayers.
President Calderón acknowledges that drug trafficking cannot be resolved
solely be confronting the cartels. He has publicly recognized that the demand
erida%20Initiative_2011.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). Mexico is receiving the bulk of the
$1.5 billion in aid. See Phillip Smith, Plan Merida Focus to Shift to Border Region,
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Aug. 17, 2011, 7:38 PM),
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/aug/17/plan_merida_focus_shift_border_r.
30
Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos & Silvina María Romano, Political-Economic Factors in U.S.
Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mérida Initiative, and the Obama Administration,
178 LATIN AM. PERSP. 93, 93 n.6 (2011). Around $1.3 billion was contributed to Mexico
through the plan; specifically, $400 million for 2008, $720 million for 2009, and $210
million for early 2010. Id.
31
See Blake Hounshell, Foreign Policy: The New Drug War We’ve Already Met, NPR (Mar.
15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124704949.
32
See Hillary Clinton Backs Mexico Drug War, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011, 11:08 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12264674.
33
Diana Washington Valdez, Official: Next Phase of Merida Initiative to Focus on Northern
Mexico, EL PASO TIMES (Aug. 16, 2011, 3:38 PM),
http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_18693357?source=pkg.
34
See Fact Sheet: The Mérida Initiative/Plan Mexico, supra note 29.
35
See Michelle Malkin, National Review: Slaughter On The Southern Border, NPR (Mar.
17, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124760306.
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for drugs within the United States has made the industry into a profitable
business, and that the flow of assault rifles from the United States into the
hands of Mexico’s cartels has contributed to the cartels’ power. Yet, he asserts
that his government has “no alternative” but to meet the cartels with military
force.36 He acknowledges that the rising death toll is “painful,” but dismisses
the dead as criminals,37 repeatedly assuring his country that 90 percent of the
dead are involved with the drug trade.38 However, 95 percent39 of the murders
are never investigated, suggesting that Calderón has no factual basis for this
assertion and revealing his administration’s bias against victims.40 Notably,
many whose lives have been touched by the violence disagree that the
casualties should be dismissed or disregarded in this way.41
On many levels, drug trafficking is a business, and one that is quite
lucrative. Profits from the industry are estimated to be between $30 billion and
$60 billion per year, which means that drug money is competitive with oil as
the greatest source of revenue for Mexico.42 The Mexican government,
particularly its army and police, has facilitated the drug trade for decades and
has participated in it extensively.43 Given the enormous profits that the
Mexican state stands to make in the drug business, the counternarcotics efforts
may not represent a sincere effort to quash the drug industry. In this sense, at
least one critic notes that this war is not against drugs, but rather one “for
drugs, for the enormous money to be made in drugs” by all the players who
can benefit from a cut of the profits, including elected officials, the police, and
the military.44
36

Stephen Sackur, ‘No Alternative’ to Mexico’s Drug War - Says Calderon, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 27, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9130155.stm.
37
See id.
38
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 10.
39
TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 40.
40
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 11.
41
See id.
42
TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 25.
43
See id.
44
BOWDEN, supra note 5, at 18.
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Much of the Mexican public suspects that Calderón launched an aggressive
military attack on the cartels in an effort to strengthen his political power and
to show that he can command with a mano dura—a heavy hand.45 Ironically,
the failure of his attempt to reduce drug-related violence and reign in the
cartels may suggest otherwise to the Mexican public.46 Mexico’s war on drugs
has come under criticism in elite political circles. Former presidents of
Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia have condemned the heavy-handed approach to
drug trafficking, pointing to the devastating impact of drug-related violence
and corruption in their countries. They have jointly called for a policy shift that
focuses on drug use as an issue of health and education.47
The United States, on the other hand, has characterized the presence of the
cartels as an “insurgency” requiring the military intervention of the Mérida
Initiative. In September 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “we
face an increasing threat from a well-organized network drug trafficking threat
that is, in some cases, morphing into or making common cause with what we
would consider an insurgency in Mexico and in Central America.”48 Clinton’s
statement conflates two very different concepts: political insurgency, which
usually refers to a unified political cause aiming to take over the government,
and drug trafficking, which involves cartels seeking to protect their business
and profits from one another.49
However, Clinton’s statement suggests, in some ways, a continuation of US
intervention in Latin America by way of policies that are ostensibly focused on

45

EL SICARIO, supra note 26, at 15.
See Sackur, supra note 36.
47
See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Cesar Gaviria & Ernesto Zedillo, The War on Drugs is a
Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123535114271444981.html.
48
Laura Carlsen, A Plan Colombia for Mexico, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Sept. 10, 2010),
http://www.fpif.org/articles/a_plan_colombia_for_mexico [hereinafter A Plan Colombia for
Mexico].
49
See id.
46
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antidrug measures.50 Plan Colombia, for example, has existed formally since
the year 2000 as a military aid program defined primarily as an effort to
combat drug smuggling.51 The United States has spent millions funding the
plan despite growing criticism of its reliance on aerial fumigation, its
connections with right-wing death squads and paramilitaries,52 and its failure to
decrease the flow of drugs from Colombia to the United States.53 Some critics
contend, however, that the goal of militarization has never been drug
eradication, arguing that the program serves instead as a pretext for the United
States to maintain a long-term “strategy of state terrorism in Colombia” to
safeguard US economic and political interests. With respect to this latter goal,
US strategy has been “remarkably effective.”54
The United States’ approach to fighting the drug trade in Mexico parallels
its methods used in Colombia. Although Clinton stated that the United States is
concerned about an insurgency of the cartels,55 the State Department may also
have other groups in mind.
President Calderón has faced the demands of powerful social movements
during his tenure, particularly from the Zapatistas group based in the state of
Chiapas. The group debuted in 1994 during an armed uprising to protest the
signing of NAFTA, and it has since sustained its anti-neoliberal demands
through media campaigns, organized meetings, and demonstrations.56 During
50
See Delgado-Ramos & Romano, supra note 30, at 94–95 (“The Colombia Plan and the
Mérida Initiative are paradigmatic but not isolated cases of US interference in Latin
America.”).
51
DOUG STOKES, AMERICA’S OTHER WAR: TERRORIZING COLOMBIA 93 (2005).
52
See Doug Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, 39 LIVE JOURNAL 26 (July
1, 2005), http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/54324.html.
53
STOKES, supra note 52, at 113.
54
Id. at 114.
55
A Plan Colombia for Mexico, supra note 48. Secretary of State Clinton compared the
political climate in Mexico to that of Colombia twenty years prior, suggesting that Mexico’s
“insurgency” calls for US military action in the same way that Colombia’s required. Id.
Notably, Clinton’s comments prompted immediate indignation from the Mexican Congress
at such an interventionist approach. Id.
56
See Laura Carlsen, Armoring NAFTA: The Battleground for Mexico’s Future, NACLA
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://nacla.org/node/4958 [hereinafter Armoring NAFTA].
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the presidential campaign of 2006, in which Calderón was elected, the
Zapatista movement launched its massive Other Campaign, a wide-scale effort
aimed at building coalitions with resistance groups around Mexico, furthering
the goal of indigenous autonomy, and providing a platform for anticapitalist
politics.57 The Campaign directly resisted the dominant agenda of the Mexican
and US governments, and its strength challenged the legitimacy of Calderón’s
administration. The Mexican government also faced a teachers’ strike and
mass rebellion in the state of Oaxaca in 2006.58
Over the course of the escalation of the war on drugs in Mexico, government
repression of political movements has become potentially less difficult. Forced
disappearances, torture, and killings effectively send a message to those who
would otherwise speak out, advising them to instead engage in selfcensorship—to remain silent. Additionally, the government is able to dismiss
extrajudicial killings committed by state actors as the work of the cartels.59
Many critics note that the military presence under the pretext of the war on
drugs effectively provides the Mexican and US governments a mechanism
with which to protect elite economic interests and crush social dissent.60
San Juan Copala, for example, a small indigenous town in Oaxaca,
supported the Zapatista’s Other Campaign and declared itself to be an
autonomous municipality in 2007.61 The town was then under siege by statesupported paramilitaries, who murdered several civilians.62 Following the
57

See Mariana Mora, Zapatista Anticapitalist Politics and the “Other Campaign”: Learning
from the Struggle for Indigenous Rights and Autonomy, 34 LATIN AM. PERSP. 64, 64–65
(2007).
58
See TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 28.
59
While it is true that the cartels partake in violence, including torture and executions, the
Mexican army has also been known to commit extrajudicial killings and subsequently blame
them on drug dealers. See Delgado-Ramos & Romano, supra note 30, at 93 n.3.
60
See id. at 95–96. Delgado-Ramos and Romano argue that the war on drugs in Latin
America represents a “stabilization-destabilization” program meant to protect US economic
interests and its access to natural resources. See id. at 103.
61
Paramilitaries Kill Two Human Rights Activists in Oaxaca, DEMOCRACY NOW!
(Apr. 30, 2010),
www.democracynow.org/2010/4/30/paramilitaries_kill_two_human_rights_activists.
62
Id.
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assassination of two human rights activists, at least one journalist wrote that
“the US-funded war on drugs certainly creates a cover for these kinds of
politically motivated attacks.”63 Given the social mobilizations that have
followed NAFTA, particularly related to the Zapatista uprising, it may be “no
wonder” that elite economic and state interests on both sides of the border
“saw the need to shield the agreement from potential attacks” through the
increased militarization of civil society.64

III. NEOLIBERALISM AT HOME AND ABROAD: ECONOMIC
PROGRAMS, SECURITY INTERESTS, AND THE USE OF SHOCK
Neoliberalism refers to the set of trends and ideas that have come to
dominate political discourse and practice in various areas, including
international trade liberalization, privatization programs, immigration
enforcement, and drug policy.65 As a concept, it facilitates making broad,
contextual connections between trends that otherwise may appear disparate and
unrelated.66 Academics, political activists, and other thinkers often use the
word “neoliberalism” to describe the political climate and set of policies,
trends, and narratives that have promoted and justified the upward
redistribution of wealth within the United States and various elite arenas of
global politics over the last forty years.67
Neoliberal economics narratives often utilize the concept of laissez-faire,
which refers to minimizing state interference with the activities of corporations
and the accumulation of capital by private actors.68 On an international level,

63

Id.
See Armoring NAFTA, supra note 56.
65
See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xi–xii.
66
See DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS
POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 49 (2011).
67
See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xi. Although neoliberalism has been hailed by its
supporters as “universally inevitable,” its vision actually represents a relatively recent
historical development. Id. at xiii.
68
See CYNTHIA KAUFMAN, IDEAS FOR ACTION: RELEVANT THEORY FOR RADICAL
CHANGE 109 (2003).
64
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free trade has been promoted as the path for success for all countries, although
such policies often favor countries of the global North.69 On local levels,
systematic privatization has generated additional markets and profit incentives
in areas that were formerly part of the public sector, such as health care,
education, and drinking water.70 The political success of these programs has
been grounded in the conceptual framework of competition, emphasizing
personal responsibility and individual freedom.71 As a result of these
programs, many worldwide elites have been able to expand their access to
wealth and resources, while middle- and low-income groups have experienced
a decrease in their standard of living.72
Numerous scholars, activists, and communities have challenged neoliberal
development on various grounds, deconstructing the myths of market selfregulation and pointing to its devastating impact on communities that are
sidelined by neoliberal programs.73 This section starts by laying out the
characteristic economic policies that define neoliberal programs and that have
led to the rise of corporate power and influence on government policy-making.
It then briefly explores the neoliberal state’s increased reliance on surveillance,
detention, and other forms of social control, looking specifically at the United
69

See id.
See id. at 109–10.
71
Id. See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 52.
72
See KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 110–11.
73
See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL
ORDER 24, 39, 93 (1999) (describing the pro-corporate, free market system of global
capitalism that has developed since World War II under the direction of the United States,
creating profits and power for elites while deepening socio-economic disparity and class
warfare); JON JETER, FLAT BROKE IN THE FREE MARKET: HOW GLOBALIZATION FLEECED
WORKING PEOPLE xi-xii (2009) (examining how global, neoliberal, free-market programs
function as a continuation of colonialism and brought “unqualified economic disaster for
ordinary people worldwide”); JOSÉ SARAMAGO ET AL., THE ZAPATISTA READER 2, 5 (Tom
Hayden ed., 2002) (Providing a series of political writings and eyewitness accounts of the
Zapatista rebellion); KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 48–54, 108–111 (offering an accessible
analysis of capitalism, neoliberalism, as well as alternate sets of ideas); DUGGAN, supra note
13, at xi-xiii (describing the rise of neoliberalism as a product of attacks on the New Deal
and on downwardly redistributive social movements, pro-business activism, various “culture
wars,” and an emergent non-redistributive form of “equality”).
70
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States’ domestic war on drugs and immigration enforcement policies. This
section closes by examining Klein’s critique presented in The Shock Doctrine,
which shows how neoliberalism capitalizes on periods of crisis—whether
perceived, actual, or created—to impose and maintain free market economic
policies while simultaneously contracting out crisis response and security
responsibilities to corporate beneficiaries.74
A. Economic Policies Within the Neoliberal Framework
Within the context of economic policy, neoliberal programs tend to demand
privatization, deregulation of government, and the slashing of social
spending.”75 These stipulations are justified by an underlying belief in laissezfaire economics and the idea that markets should be free from state
interference.76 Yet, as this section attempts to show, in reality, those demands
function as mechanisms that expand corporate earnings while simultaneously
generating profits for politicians, producing a “powerful ruling alliance”
between the two groups.77
The systematic privatization and deregulation of goods and services occurs
under the banner of “free market” competition.78 On the ground, privatization
means that allegedly public programs and services are removed from
government control and contracted out, or placed in private, profit-generating
hands.79 This trend is pervasive; it includes everything from education and
garbage collection to the construction and management of prisons and
immigration detention centers.80 Privatization is often justified as a way of
improving the efficiency of “plodding, incompetent” public programs and
state-owned industries.81 Yet, this rationalization ignores the reality that the
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 8–11, 15, 18.
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greater “productivity” of the private sector is often attained through flawed
means: lower pay for employees, worse workplace conditions, and lesser
quality services, materials, or products.82 Additionally, privatization removes
wealth and decision-making power from mechanisms of public
accountability.83 The goal of profit generation supplants nonmonetary priorities
such as the health and welfare of people and communities.84 By the same
token, the nonmonetary costs—including abandonment, trauma, terror, death,
and detention—paid by those whose lives are affected by privately made
decisions remain unaccounted for when businesses balance their budget.85
These types of serious costs associated with neoliberalism are particularly
salient within the scope of this article. As discussed below, the privatization of
warfare, incarceration, immigration enforcement, and other security-related
industries has increasingly come to dominate public policy decisions made in
these arenas, favoring profits over people.86
Neoliberalism is also characterized by the dismantling of public systems for
addressing poverty or providing basic social services.87 Within the United
States, “antistate” government actors have advocated for the state’s retreat
from various areas of social safety nets, including welfare and public
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housing.88 Instead of having a systemic approach to social welfare, many social
service functions are fulfilled today by a “shadow state” of nonprofit and
volunteer organizations.89 The costs of public welfare are thereby transferred
from government agencies to individuals, families, and communities.90 Many
scholars and activists have characterized the downsizing of the state in this
capacity as a long-term process of abandoning specific sectors of society.91
Additionally, this process has allowed the “huge transfers of public wealth to
private hands” that characterizes neoliberalism.92
Privatization, deregulation, and reducing social spending represent the “freemarket trinity”93 of neoliberal stipulations; together, these demands have
facilitated “the rise of corporatism.”94 In a neoliberal climate, big businesses
and government are separated only by “hazy and ever-shifting lines”;
increasingly, corporate and political spheres have merged.95 For economic
elites, the benefits of organizing wealth in this way are unparalleled. But
because true neoliberal programs leave the majority of the population outside
of the circle of prosperity, the protection of corporatist arrangements often
involve the use of “aggressive surveillance […], mass incarceration, shrinking
civil liberties and often, though not always, torture.”96
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B. Legitimate Violence: Security and Surveillance in the Neoliberal State
In contrast to the narratives of freedom and democracy promoted in the
context of neoliberal programs, many people and communities actually
experience heightened surveillance and exposure to state-sanctioned violence
in the context of the neoliberal framework. The neoliberal security state97 is
less concerned with mitigating the human costs or social fallout of marketbased policies; instead, much of its power is directed at enforcing
neoliberalism’s disparities through the threat and use of legitimate violence—
violence that is validated by or carried out by the government.98 The
development of security and surveillance policies within the United States is
particularly visible in trends such as the rise of mass incarceration, particularly
as a result of the domestic war on drugs, and heightened immigration
enforcement, both of which help to set the stage for discussing the drug war in
Mexico. Notably, these programs have relied on identity and cultural politics,
particularly the politics of race, to legitimize heightened security and
surveillance measures.99
Critics of the US “prison industrial complex” argue that the rise in mass
incarceration, which began under President Richard Nixon through law-andorder policies, represents a response to the social movements and political
upheavals that faced the Nixon administration.100 Subsequently, the tough-oncrime approach was continued under President Ronald Reagan as a method of
managing the socio-economic dislocation produced by neoliberal economic
97
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adjustments.101 Law-and-order policies are racially neutral on their face,
focusing on the “threat of crime to ‘average’ citizens, even as actual crime
rates have declined,” but their impact has undeniably racialized
consequences.102 Civil rights lawyer and author Michelle Alexander has been
at the forefront of exposing the role of the war on drugs103 in creating a
criminal system that functions as a form of social control targeting
communities of color.104 Alexander contends that drug laws have replaced
slavery and Jim Crow as mechanisms for creating and enforcing a racial caste
system.105 The “get tough” movement and the war on drugs are directly
responsible for the rise in prison populations since the 1980s, and three-fourths
of the individuals that have been incarcerated during the war on drugs are
people of color.106 With 2.3 million people107 presently behind bars, mass
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incarceration in the United States functions as a form of social control that is
“unparalleled in the world’s history.”108
The “get tough” movement and the war on drugs have also targeted
noncitizens, creating a political climate so harsh that it is often referred to as
the “criminalization” of immigration policy.109 One aspect of this
criminalization has been the severe penalties imposed on non-citizens for
contact with the criminal system.110 Beginning in the 1980s, deportation
became an increasingly common collateral consequence for noncitizens who
have received criminal convictions.111 During the 1980s, the media and many
politicians emphasized the urgency of “the criminal-alien problem,” arguing
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service was not sufficiently
addressing the issue. This prompted Congress to pass legislation addressing the
intersection of criminal and immigration law, imposing increasingly harsh
sanctions on noncitizens for criminal and drug violations.112 Over the span of a
decade, 30,000 people were deported on the basis of criminal or drug
offenses.113 By 2011, the number jumped substantially; at least 44,653
noncitizens convicted of drug-related crimes were deported in just one year.114
The cooperation between criminal enforcement and civil immigration
authorities represents a second method of criminalization.115 One of the most
concerning aspects of current immigration enforcement policies is the use of
108
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109
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110
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111
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state and local police, county jails, and the criminal system to channel
noncitizens into the expanding network of immigration detention centers and
to place them in deportation proceedings.116 As a result, Mexicans who migrate
north as a result of the drug war at home, as many do,117 and who are non-US
citizens, may also be affected by the war on drugs in the United States.
The neoliberal security state utilizes cultural and identity politics, including
racialized narratives, to justify its reliance on systems of violence to ostensibly
promote security.118 In this context, the types of “aggressive surveillance”119
listed here, including mass incarceration, immigration detention, and
deportation, appear to represent practices that are characteristic of the
neoliberal security state and that serve to facilitate the enforcement of
disparities produced by corporatist arrangements. The mechanisms of “law and
order” function as legitimate in the sense that they are legally protected and
constitute central aspects of political discourse. The human rights abuses
committed by the Mexican security forces are legitimate too, in the sense that
they are state-sanctioned and are committed by authorities that benefit from
having a monopoly of force. Law enforcement officials “openly admit their
fear or unwillingness” to investigate cases involving state abuses. As the
family of one victim of human rights violations committed by state security
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forces was told by a Mexican prosecutor, “you can’t win against the
military.”120
C. The Shock Doctrine
“Crises are, in a way, democracy-free zones—gaps in politics as
usual when the need for consent and consensus do not seem to
apply.”121
—Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster
Capitalism
“Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change,” wrote Milton
Friedman, venerated leader of the rise in the free market and, with it,
unrestrained capitalism,122 in 1982.123 The crux of Klein’s thesis in The Shock
Doctrine is that democracy must be suspended in order to implement true freemarket reforms and that the precondition for this suspension is often presented
by some type of significant collective fear or trauma.124 Friedman himself was
aware of this, which Klein points out. For many years, his free-market ideas
were sidelined by the mainstream—until, beginning in the 1970s, he helped
pioneer the strategy of imposing politically unpopular changes during periods
of crisis when democratic channels were (temporarily) disengaged.125
In the 1950s, Friedman was the driving force behind the University of
Chicago’s Department of Economics, whose fundamentalist approach to freemarket economics came to be known simply as Chicago School economics, an
approach whose influence on today’s global economic systems is difficult to
overstate.126 Friedman’s vision of the market allowed no space for state
regulations. He proposed that the minimum wage should be eliminated, that
corporations should be able to sell goods across national boundaries, that
120
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governments should cease to protect workers or local industries, that taxes, if
they must exist, should be minimal, and that all income levels should pay taxes
at the same rate.127 He called for the privatization of health care, education,
pensions, and national parks.128 He contended that economic problems could
be solved by a stricter application of free-market fundamentals and called for
the removal of barriers to profit making by private entities.129 For some time
though, Friedman could not point to any examples where these strategies had
worked, much less been tried, as he claimed they would.130
An opportunity came in 1956 when the US State Department collaborated
with Chicago’s Economics Department to bring Chilean students to study
under Friedman and his colleagues. The program apparently sought out
Chilean students because Chile had become a breeding ground for
developmentalist economics, which the program intended to change.131
Developmentalism, which had taken hold in several countries around the
globe, aimed to break the dependence of third world countries on colonial
powers through nationalizing industries, subsidizing local businesses, building
strong unions, and blocking foreign imports with protectionist tariffs.132 US
and European corporations that were invested in Latin America increasingly
felt threatened by such reforms and pressured their governments to act on their
behalf.133 Friedman’s mantra of severing the state from all interference in the
economy aligned with corporate demands for less regulation, and the State
Department organized for the Chilean students to study under him for that
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reason.134 By 1963, many in the group returned to Chile and set up a Friedmancentered economics department at their home institution, thereby allowing
hundreds of Chileans to study the same curriculum without leaving the
country.135 The students who learned this free-market ideology became known
around the region as “los Chicago Boys.”136
The Chicago Boys had trouble breaking into Chile’s mainstream economic
policy discourses, as the country was still focused on developmentalism. In
1970, all three major political parties favored nationalizing the country’s
biggest industry, the copper mines, which were controlled by US companies.137
Salvador Allende was elected president in 1970, and US transnationals feared
the loss of property, investments, and profit under his Popular Unity
government. For example, the International Telephone and Telegraph
Company (ITT) owned 70 percent of Chile’s phone system, which was slated
to become nationalized. The company secretly worked with the CIA and the
State Department to block Allende’s inauguration,138 but by 1973, Allende had
gained significant political backing in Chile.139
A group of Chilean business leaders who had been educated in Chicago, and
whose activities were funded by the CIA, formulated a two-prong plan to
counter Allende’s economic program: (1) to work in coalition with the military
to prepare for a regime change and (2) to design specific plans for the
neoliberal restructuring of Chile’s economy.140 On September 11, 1973,
Allende was overthrown in a violent coup, resulting in the installation of the
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military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, who remained president of
Chile until 1990.141 On all accounts, the toppling of Allende represents a
military exploit. But Orlando Letelier, ambassador to Washington under
Allende, had a different view. He saw the takeover as an “equal partnership”
between the generals and the intellectuals: the military provided the brutal
force, and the Chicago Boys wrote the free-market economic program for the
country’s new government.142
Pinochet’s rule was to be marked by three discrete types of shock. First,
there was the shock of the military coup, which led to the death of President
Allende and transformed the capitol into a war zone.143 Immediately thereafter
came what Friedman termed economic “shock treatment,”144 as well as the
shock of widespread torture and the executions of civilians.145
Friedman explicitly advised General Pinochet against the gradual imposition
of free market policies—he used the phrase economic “shock treatment” in his
communications with the General, assuring him that a strict application of free
market fundamentals would allow the Chilean economy to self-correct its high
inflation, which had jumped to 375 percent during the first year and a half of
Chicago-style reforms under Pinochet.146 Friedman advised cutting
government spending by 25 percent and to move towards completely free
trade.147 He suggested that the hundreds of thousands of people who would be
let go from their jobs in the public sector would be able to find work in the
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private one.148 Following this advice, Pinochet privatized nearly 500 stateowned companies and banks, releasing them immediately into private hands,
and cut spending by 27 percent, to half of what it had been under Allende, with
health and education sectors taking the deepest blows.149
Pinochet was a brutal dictator; his regime was notorious for its human rights
violations.150 Within days of Pinochet taking power, approximately 13,500
civilians were arrested and detained.151 Thousands were held at the two main
football stadiums in the capital city of Santiago, where they were tortured and
executed.152 The regime was characterized by repression—the press was
subjected to censorship, and labor unions and strikes were prohibited.153 Over
3,200 people disappeared or were executed and nearly 28,000 people were
tortured,154 sending a clear and threatening message to any potential dissenters.
At least 80,000 were imprisoned and 200,000 fled the country in political
exile.155 The Chicago School economists refused to recognize any relationship
between their policies and the use of political terror,156 even though the
Chicago Boys worked with the military in the period leading up to the coup
and during the economic restructuring of Chile took place immediately upon
the government overthrow.157
Pinochet’s economic shock program brought extreme wealth to a limited
number of elites,158 but it also signaled the onset of widespread poverty in
Chile. Prices soared while wages dropped.159 Approximately 74 percent of the
income of an average Chilean family went to buy bread, while basic items such
148
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as milk and bus fare became out of reach for many.160 Privatization was
imposed on Chile’s public schools, its health care system, and even its social
security system.161 The socio-economic situation was so dire that one of the
Chicago Boys, somewhat of a dissident from the group, drew a direct line from
the brutality of the free-market economic policies to the violence that Pinochet
used to repress civil society, linking the two as mutually reinforcing. He wrote
that Friedman’s economic adjustments brought so much suffering that the
changes could not have been “imposed or carried out without the twin
elements that underlie them all: military force and political terror.”162
The majority of the people who were detained, tortured, and executed in
Chile were not “extremists” or “fanatics,” as the government claimed; instead,
they were people that the dictatorship had identified as potential threats to its
neoliberal economic program.163 Systematic raids directed at workers in
factories led to the mass arrest of people involved in the labor movement
beginning on the day of the coup.164 Farmers were also targeted. Not only did
the state’s terror campaign remove potential roadblocks to the economic
program, but it also effectively sent a message to those who witnessed the
disappearances, ensuring that the streets remained “clear and calm.”165 Sergio
de Castro, who was educated at the Chicago School and intimately involved
with the planning of the coup, did not turn a blind eye to the military excesses
of the regime as he served as minister of economics under Pinochet. To the
contrary, he wrote that the neoliberal, free-market reforms never could have
happened before the coup because public opinion was “very much against”
such policies. He continued, “[i]t was our luck that President Pinochet
understood and had the character to withstand criticism,” noting that
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“‘authoritarian government’ is best suited to safeguarding economic freedom
because of its ‘impersonal’ use of power.”166
The shock doctrine model that emerged in Chile under Pinochet is based on
exploitation of a period of crisis in order to push through radical economic
changes. The privatization of crisis creation and crisis response167 characterizes
what Klein terms the “shock doctrine” today. Various aspects of the US
national security apparatus have undergone a profound privatization process,
particularly under the Bush administration. Functions that were once iconic to
the state law, such as the military, border control, prisons, and surveillance
technology, have become parts of the private sector.168 This arrangement
represents a new form of disaster capitalism within which “wars and disaster
responses are so fully privatized that they are themselves the new market.”169
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense under President George W. Bush,
was close friends with Milton Friedman, who admired Rumsfeld for his
commitment to deregulated markets.170 Rumsfeld is now said to have presided
over a “transformation” of the US military, reducing the number of its troops,
and outsourcing many of its functions to private contractors. While the
Pentagon was already notorious for contracting out weapons manufacturing,
the hiring of corporations such as Blackwater and Halliburton to “perform
duties ranging from high-risk chauffeuring to prisoner interrogation to catering
to health care” represented an entirely new arena of privatization.171 These
changes did not reduce the budget of the military (Rumsfeld requested an 11
percent budget increase shortly after taking the position); instead, in line with
corporatist principles, the move redistributed funds from the public to the
private sphere.172
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Dick Cheney, vice president under Bush, also helped to advance the use of
private contractors in the military context, an endeavor he had begun earlier as
Secretary of Defense under Bush Sr. when he hired Halliburton’s engineering
division, Brown & Root, to identify tasks performed by US troops that could
be contracted out for a profit. This initiative led to the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP, and the creation of a service contract for
providing largely unlimited “logistical support” for the military, which
Halliburton later won.173 Cheney then moved into the private sphere during the
Clinton administration, serving as CEO of Halliburton Company. Under his
leadership, the company nearly doubled the amount of money that it procured
through contracts with the US government from $1.2 billion to $2.3 billion,
particularly by providing troops abroad with services such as “fast-food
outlets, supermarkets, movie theaters, and high-tech gyms.”174 Lockheed
Martin, the world’s largest defense contractor, similarly moved into logistical
support during this period under the leadership of Cheney’s wife, gaining
contracts to sort the mail, cut Social Security checks, and conduct the US
census.175
This corporatist orientation means policy decision making is increasingly
framed by private interests while government activities are designed to
function as an unending marketplace for private, contract-seeking agencies.176
The federal government’s response to the 9/11 attacks, for example, has been
characterized by the creation of the war on terror, whose goals appear to be
focused on “regulat[ing] and control[ing] the citizenry”177 and creating a
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profitable, long-term market centered on the homeland security industry178—as
opposed to a policy that prioritizes the safety of its residents.179 The homeland
security industry is now larger than Hollywood and the music business,
contracting out any number of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and data
mining technologies and services.180 Major contracts, such as that for US
VISIT, a screening program that takes digital fingerprints of visitors and
noncitizens upon arrival in the US, have been awarded based on political
connections instead of quality products.181 With little oversight provided by the
Department of Homeland Security, companies may promote their products at
flashy trade shows, overcharge for their services, and provide faulty products,
with little to no accountability, particularly to constituents.182 As the New York
Times discerned in 2007, “Without a public debate or formal policy decision,
contractors have become a virtual fourth branch of government.”183
There is little discussion of the implications of being “engaged in a fully
privatized war built to have no end.”184 The 2003 invasion of Iraq, arranged
under the auspices of the “Shock and Awe” strategy, which was conceptually
developed at the National Defense University,185 was designed to overwhelm
and psychologically torture the public by destroying its phone system,
electricity, and cultural fabric contained in the nation’s museums and
178
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libraries.186 The rebuilding of Iraq was then contracted out. Private accountants
were hired to “build a ‘market-driven system’” in the country; think tanks were
hired to help privatize Iraqi companies, and private security firms and defense
contractors were hired to train Iraq’s new army and police.187 Without
oversight and not subject to any regulations, these companies often proceeded
to subcontract out the duties, and the bulk of the work was never completed.188
At home, the war on drugs similarly appears to be built to have no end,
creating a long-term source of profits for certain security-oriented companies.
Drug laws take most of the credit for filling our prisons, and private prison
companies continue to benefit from these laws by obtaining government
contracts. As governor of Texas, George Bush increased the number of private
prisons from twenty-six to forty-two, despite stories of prisoner maltreatment
within such institutions.189 Since 9/11, private-prison companies have
benefitted as national security concerns have been mobilized to target and
detain noncitizens.190 Companies in the business of immigration detention can
be paid roughly $85 per detainee, per day, by the Department of Homeland
Security.191 The US government’s increasing reliance on detention in the arena
of immigration enforcement has been partially driven by private prison
corporations seeking to expand their government contracts.192
In essence, the shock doctrine allows neoliberal capitalism to find new
markets in every step of its own expansion: the creation of disaster or crisis
(the drug problem, the “criminal alien” problem, the devastation of Iraq); the
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neoliberal restructuring that often occurs behind closed doors during moments
of crisis (the economic changes under Pincohet); and the response to disaster
(rebuilding Iraq, imprisoning drug offenders, detaining immigrants).
Intervention no longer simply represents a means to the end of protecting
corporate interests, as it did in Chile.193 The process of destruction and
reorientation is now so “fully privatized” that intervention is the end itself,
creating deep and long-lasting opportunities for companies to profit from the
exploitation of crisis.194

IV. NEOLIBERALISM & RESISTANCE IN MEXICO
The signing of NAFTA in 1994 represents the formalization of
neoliberalism in Mexico.195 While the agreement has been commended in elite
circles for opening corporate investment across national borders, it has also
been condemned for undermining the gains of working communities,196
weakening environment regulations,197 and threatening the food security of
Mexico.198 The fact that NAFTA opened borders for the movement of capital,
but not for workers, also faces widespread criticism.199 NAFTA’s impact
warrants a deeper critique, however, with respect to the wealth gained by
transnational companies on the one hand, and the systemic violence
experienced by the poor and middles classes on the other. In a climate of
deepening social inequalities, anxiety about protecting business interests in
193
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Mexico has risen, meaning that political dissent, including organized
movements like the Zapatistas, may be of heightened concern for the Mexican
and US governments.
A. NAFTA Expanded Corporate Wealth and Undermined Collective SocioEconomic Security
In terms of trade integration, NAFTA is a success. The agreement’s primary
goal was to diminish barriers to investment and trade, and, by those
measurements, NAFTA has succeeded.200 A small circle of investors have
prospered under NAFTA. By 2005, merchandise trading between Mexico and
the United States had increased 227 percent.201 Wal-Mart became the largest
retailer in Mexico.202 US-based agribusiness giant Cargill saw its income
increase by 660 percent since NAFTA began, reaching $3.95 billion in fiscal
year 2007–08.203
NAFTA’s impact, however, on the socio-economic security of many people
in Mexico has been staggering. The treaty’s launch was marked by a monetary
crisis in 1994, the year it came into effect. The value of the peso dropped from
3.4 to 7.2 to the dollar within a week, and prices in Mexico soared by 24
percent in the first four months of 1994.204 Privatization allowed Mexican
industries to be sold to US-based corporations, which meant that unions were
busted and workplace conditions worsened.205 Mexico’s main north-south rail
line came under the ownership of the US-based company Union Pacific, and
200
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employment in the rail industry dropped from over 90,000 to 36,000.206 The
leaders of the railroad union, who once commanded a national presence, were
imprisoned, and the union disappeared from Mexican politics.207 Longshoring
wages, once $100–160 per day, plummeted to $40–50 per day after the
Mexican ports were sold to US-based corporations.208 By 1995, one year into
the agreement, one million jobs had been lost.209 The growth of corporate retail
like Wal-Mart affects the livelihood of innumerable family-owned and small
businesses. Twelve years after NAFTA, real wages for Mexican workers had
been reduced by 22 percent, even though worker productivity had risen by 45
percent.210
Changes in agricultural policies under NAFTA also had a devastating
impact in Mexico. While subsidies from the Mexican government to its
farmers became illegal, major subsidies from the US government to its growers
remained protected.211 After the elimination of Mexican subsidies, hundreds of
thousands of family farms and small farms could no longer make a living by
selling the food that they produced.212 Rural communities that once survived
on subsistence agriculture now face malnutrition and starvation, and Mexico is
increasingly dependent on expensive food imports.213 Two million farmers
have been forced to leave their land, internally displaced or forced into the
migration stream toward the United States.214
206
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As a result of NAFTA’s impact on Mexico’s economy, more people left
Mexico for the United States in the years after NAFTA was passed than in any
other period,215 with over six million people crossing the border within thirteen
years of NAFTA’s implementation.216 Yet, the US immigration debate does
not acknowledge the role of economic displacement in producing the MexicoUS migration stream.217 The US immigration system also fails to acknowledge
this role—most workers displaced from Mexico since NAFTA have arrived in
the United States without immigration authorization.218
Notably, the displacement of people and their subsequent undocumented
movement across borders tends to benefit both the cartels and US companies
that depend on cheap labor.219 Transnational cartels make tens of millions of
dollars each year engaged in the unauthorized movement of migrants.220 Entire
US industries, including the agricultural sector and food processing,221 the
paper industry,222 tourism—including the hotel and restaurant industries—and
domestic services223 depend on migrant labor. Many companies profit
immensely from the labor of undocumented workers, who are “more
vulnerable and socially isolated,” allowing for their work to be compensated at
lower rates.224 The displacement of workers caused by neoliberal reforms,
among farmers, and could not be sold. NAFTA changed that—it removed Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution, allowing ejidos to be sold. After land sales were completed, many of
the people who used to work the land became wageworkers employed by other landowners
or moved to cities to find jobs. BACON, supra note 196, at 58.
215
BACON, supra note 196, at 51.
216
See id. at 64.
217
See id. at 67. “The whole process that creates migrants is […] displacement, an
unmentionable word in the Washington discourse.” Id. at 68.
218
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219
See Morales & Watt, supra note 28 (“Transnational drug cartels and corporations, in
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220
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222
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contributing an average of $45,000. They received an average annual income of only
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including NAFTA, has provided cartels with a steady stream of “walking
merchandise”225: people seeking assistance in crossing the border without
authorization despite the severe risks they face on such a journey.
Displacement has also supplied the US economy with an “army of available
workers”: a mobile workforce that typically arrives with a “vulnerable, secondclass status, at a price that [employers] want to pay.”226
B. The Zapatistas and Resistance of NAFTA
“No amount of law-and-order, however, can quell deepening
unrest in a world demarcated so deeply by wealth and poverty.”
—Tom Hayden, The Zapatista Reader227
The Zapatista Army for National Liberation deliberately timed its uprising
for the day that NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994.228 As Mexican
farming subsidies were made illegal and US products flooded the market, the
Zapatistas foresaw the consequences that would be felt in Mexico’s southern
rural regions,229 calling NAFTA a “death sentence” for indigenous
communities.230 The group started what has been called the first major
movement to challenge neoliberalism, and it has sustained eighteen years of
organized opposition, bringing visibility to the fallout of programs like
NAFTA and to the struggle of indigenous peoples.231 Additionally, the
Zapatista uprising has sparked a broader mobilization of groups demanding a
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more inclusive democratic model in Mexico and an end to free-trade economic
policies.232
The Zapatista uprising marked an “enormous blow to business and
government interests,” and it has “since acquired profound symbolic
significance” for those interested in resisting the free-trade model of global
integration.233 As such, the rebellion has fueled anxiety about the safety of
NAFTA investments. One of Mexico’s main goals in signing the agreement
was to increase its share of foreign direct investment,234 as companies are often
attracted to Mexico because they can pay residents lower wages.235 Analysts
cited the Zapatista uprising as one of the main reasons for the devaluation of
the peso in December 1994 because the uprising caused uncertainty among
investors.236 The implication here may be that anti-neoliberal movements are
incompatible with NAFTA.237
Since bursting onto the political scene, the Zapatistas have been targeted by
the Mexican government in a “low-intensity” war.238 In 1995, the Mexican
army invaded Zapatista territory, triggering the displacement of approximately
10,000 to 20,000 people.239 In the years following, Zapatista communities have
essentially lived under military and police occupation, with as many as 65,000
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troops stationed in the conflict zone.240 Paramilitaries often carry out the dirty
work of the state.241 Zapatista women report experiencing a continuous threat
of rape and harassment by the military, police, and paramilitaries because of
their political involvement.242 In 1997, forty-six indigenous women, children,
and men from the Tzotzil community of Acteal were massacred by
paramilitaries, this being one of the most brutal examples of the violence.243
Since the escalation of the war on drugs, the militarization of Mexico has
heightened, allowing the state to criminalize expressions of social resistance.244
Although Zapatista territory has experienced significantly less drug-related
violence than the rest of Mexico, “there has been an increase in state violence
against those communities under the pretext of looking for narcotics.”245 In the
climate of “overwhelming violence and impunity” created in the war, the
“assassinations of political opponents—indigenous rights leaders, human rights
advocates, anti-mining activists, guerrilla insurgents—are quickly swept into
the ever rising body count without much attention or outcry.”246
This dynamic is not lost on the Zapatistas. In May 2011, the group held one
of their biggest demonstrations to protest Calderón’s violent antidrug
strategy.247 Over 15,000 supporters joined the group, and they marched in
240

Shannon Speed, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Indigenous Women and Gendered
Resistance in the Wake of Acteal, in WOMEN OF CHIAPAS: MAKING HISTORY IN TIMES OF
STRUGGLE AND HOPE 48 (Christine Eber & Christine Kovic eds., 2003).
241
See id. at 51–52 (describing the brutality of the Acteal massacre). See STEPHEN, supra
note 230, at 199.
242
See STEPHEN, supra note 240, at 177–78.
243
See id. at 199; Speed, supra note 240, at 47–48. Following the massacre, women in
Chiapas mobilized while soldiers were entering communities and destroying property. See
Speed, supra note 240, at 53–54. Women, including some who were barefoot with babies on
their backs, responded by launching stand-offs, blocking the roads leading into towns. See id.
244
Delgado-Ramos & Romano, supra note 30, at 96.
245
Morales & Watt, supra note 28.
246
TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 29.
247
Gloria Muñoz Ramírez, Zapatistas March in Solidarity Against Calderon’s Drug War,
AMERICAS PROGRAM (May 28, 2011, 12:35 PM),
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/4673. The Zapatistas marched in solidarity with a
much larger movement for peace and an end to the drug war taking place in the same
period. See id.

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

A War on Civilians 963

silence calling for an end to the war. They carried thousands of signs bearing
the messages, “No more blood,” “We’re fed up,” and “Stop Calderón’s
War.”248 Near the end of a speech, one comandante repeated a message seven
times, a message intended for all the victims of Calderón’s war and their
families: “You are not alone.”249

V. THE USE OF SHOCK: MÉRIDA, NARCO-CORRUPTION, THE
SECURITY INDUSTRY, AND A NATIONAL CRISIS
While still negotiating NAFTA, Mexico strove to show that it was cracking
down on the narcotics industry in order to calm US concerns that opening the
countries’ shared border to investment and trade would also allow an increased
flow of illicit substances.250 The New York Times ran a front-page story
reporting that the drug traffickers intended to use the trade agreement for their
own benefit as a cover for their operations—Congress demanded assurance
that the border would be “locked tight from drug runners.”251
Proponents of NAFTA in both governments helped to “recraft” Mexico’s
antidrug image.252 Mexico stepped up its drug control efforts while the US
State Department published positive yearly reviews detailing the number of
drug seizures made by Mexican authorities, the number of drug-related arrests,
and the number of poppy and marijuana crops destroyed.253 Once NAFTA was
passed, however, anxiety about border policing and security has only
intensified, especially around the two main cross-border flows that NAFTA
does not regulate: immigration and illicit drugs.254
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A. Mérida: An Initiative to Armor NAFTA
The years since NAFTA’s passage have been marked by an escalation in
joint security initiatives between the two countries.255 In 2005, just over a
decade into NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed a regional
defense program called the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), which
was widely understood as an effort to expand NAFTA.256 The SPP’s official
mission aimed to “increase security and to enhance prosperity among the three
countries through greater cooperation.”257 In a post-9/11 world, it also aimed to
make the United States’ “war on terror” into a regional security issue.258
According to Thomas Shannon, US Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, the SPP was intended to address any security concerns
that might be implicated in cross-border economic cooperation.259 The
underlying mission of the program crystallized when he stated, “[t]o a certain
extent, we’re armoring NAFTA.”260
The history of the Mérida Initiative and US funding for Mexico’s war on
drugs can be traced back to the SPP,261 whose agenda covered 300 different
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policy arenas,262 including immigration, the environment, and food regulations,
among others.263 Originally, it was thought that President Bush would unveil
the details of the Mérida Initiative at a SPP meeting in Montebello, Quebec, in
August 2007, but the plan’s release was delayed, possibly due to a large
presence of protesters and high levels of tension between activists and
police.264 The SPP had come under intense criticism in all three countries.265 A
broad coalition of labor activists, environmentalists, and human rights
advocates266 were outraged by the closed-door nature of the talks.267 Five
hundred protesters converged on the Quebec meeting, and police resorted to
tear gas and pepper spray during confrontations.268 In 2009, the SPP was
declared inactive, for reasons that are not entirely clear.269
The Mérida Initiative, on the other hand, was formally announced in
October 2007.270 The $1.4 billion aid package was discussed at SPP meetings,
and the US State Department has made it clear that there is a link between the
SPP and the Initiative.271 Although the militarization of Mexico’s drug war is
narrower in its agenda than the SPP and, in the end, more politically
262
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sustainable, its impact on civil society in Mexico has been no less than
devastating.
B. Narco-Corruption as a Reflection of Corporatism
“When activities thought of as corrupt become so prevalent in a
government that it is impossible to speak of an institution free of
them, when corruption ceases to be an aberration and becomes an
integral part of the system, it is then no longer accurate to speak of
corruption as such.”
—John Gibler, Mexico Unconquered272
Eduardo Valle, former advisor to the Mexican attorney general, stated in
1995 that the drug industry had become “driving forces, pillars even, of our
economic growth.”273 The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
estimates that the illicit drug industry has earned Mexico between $30 billion
and $50 billion in profit annually for the last twenty years.274 The industry is
often said to be second only to oil in its earning capacity for Mexico; its profits
may exceed the oil industry, but no official numbers exist to compare the
two.275
The rise of corporatism in the United States has developed slowly over time;
eventually, the “so-called revolving door” that characterized relationships
between government and business was replaced by an “archway”; in the
context of disaster response, entire industries have “set up shop inside the
government.”276 The revolving door between cartels and the Mexican state, in
the context of drug trafficking, became an archway in the 1990s, when direct
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participation by Mexican government actors in the drug business accelerated
substantially.277
Drug cartels function like other businesses in certain aspects of their
structure and in their need for some level of cooperation from the state in order
to prosper. The common workers in the drug trade, the sellers and smugglers,
are largely made up of individuals with few socio-economic opportunities,
who, upon entering the drug business, deal with an “unpredictable career that
often leads to prison, death, or ruin.”278 Trafficking organizations are at least
partially hierarchical structures,279 and, similar to other capitalist businesses,
the lowest members make relatively little profit while the upper echelons may
accumulate startling levels of wealth.280
In order to maintain control of transportation routes, cartels require a certain
amount of cooperation from the police, military, and government officials.281
The most powerful cartel in a given area receives law enforcement
protection.282 In some respects, local government and law enforcement may
not have a lot of choice in deciding whether to cooperate with drug traffickers.
From January to October 2010, eleven municipal mayors were killed in
Mexico—more than one death of an elected official per month.283 The killings
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are assumed to have been committed by criminal organizations to intimidate
the government.284 They likely occurred either because the local governments
began refusing to facilitate cartel activities or because the governments began
to impede the activities of the cartels. Either way, the deaths imply that cartels
need the government to cooperate in order to do their business, and that they
are prepared to obtain that cooperation through any means necessary.285
El Sicario, an anonymous ex-employee of the drug business, maintains that
all of the law enforcement academies in Mexico have been used as training
grounds by the cartels.286 Students learn how to handle weapons, recognize
faces, pursue people in an urban chase without losing them, and conduct
surveillance, all of which are of use to the cartels.287 El Sicario recounts his
own story of working for the cartels from the time he began training with the
police, explaining that fifty of the two hundred students he graduated with
were already on the payroll of a drug trafficking organization.288
The “explosion of violence” in recent years has not slowed the drug trade. In
fact, El Sicario suggests that “the atmosphere of unrestrained violence acts as a
smokescreen for the real business and that the money flow is now better than
ever.”289 Additionally, workers economically displaced in the wake of NAFTA
have begun growing illicit drugs, supplying the cartels with merchandise. As a
result of the free-trade agreement, “[b]y 2007 a kilo of illicit drugs could get a
price 300 times higher than a kilo of maize; a kilo of marijuana or poppies was
worth more than a ton of beans.”290 The number of hectares dedicated to
growing poppies eventually outnumbered those which are dedicated to
growing maize.291 By all accounts, the cartels have not suffered in the midst of
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NAFTA and the militarization of Mexico’s war on drugs, nor has the presence
of narco-corruption diminished.
C. A Privatized War in which the Weapons Industry Fuels Both Sides
The merging of corporate, political, and financial interests in the arena of
national security is reflected in US aid to Mexico for the drug war;292 in
particular, private profits are generated in the US weapons industry, which
supplies arms to both the traffickers and the Mexican state.
The US arms industry benefits from supplying the traffickers. Organized
crime organizations and their members need access to high-power weapons
like “missiles launchers, machine guns, and grenades.”293 Because Mexico has
stricter gun laws than the United States, “American guns are pouring over the
border.”294 Today, there are about 15 million illegal firearms in Mexico, 90
percent of which likely came from the United States.295 As a result, Calderón
complains that his government is “outgunned”296 by the cartels’ access to US
weapons and justifies his militarized approach to antidrug policy on this basis.
On the other side of the drug war, Mexican law enforcement received
$132.5 million, which funded security and surveillance equipment as well as
training.297 Most of these funds went to the Federal Police Force, with the rest
to Customs, Immigration, and Communications.298

292

This merging of corporate and government interests was described earlier in reference to
the “prison industrial complex” in the United States and in reference to US military presence
in Iraq. See generally KLEIN, supra note 2, at 283–322 (describing the outsourcing of
military functions to private contractors, which high-level government officials directly
profited from due to ties in the corporate security industry).
293
Mexico: U.S. Must Stop Gun Trade At Border, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2009, 2:34 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/28/world/main4835694.shtml (citing an interview
with President Calderón).
294
Plan Mexico and the US-Funded Militarization of Mexico, DEMOCRACY NOW! (July 31,
2008) http://www.democracynow.org/2008/7/31/plan_mexico.
295
Morales & Watt, supra note 28.
296
Mexico: U.S. Must Stop Gun Trade At Border, supra note 293.
297
See A Primer on Plan Mexico, supra note 261.
298
See id.

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012

970 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

US defense corporations receive contracts to supply arms to the Mexican
government through this funding. Over 40 percent of the Mérida Initiative’s
money goes to defense companies; the funding was used to purchase eight Bell
helicopters, which cost $13 million each, for the Mexican Army and two
CASA 235 maritime patrol planes, which cost $50 million each, for the
Mexican Navy.299 Bell Helicopter is owned by another company named
Textron.300 Textron, a publically traded company, is governed by a board that
includes Kathleen M. Bader, who sat on President Bush’s Homeland Security
Advisory Council for seven years and was a director of Halliburton, the
company that received many of the contracts to rebuild Iraq.301
The Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on weapons and security “structurally
revamps the basis of the binational relationship in ways meant to permanently
emphasize military aspects over much-needed development aid and
modifications in trade and investment policy.”302 The direct presence of the US
military in Mexico’s territory would be illegal, and it would also provoke a
strong nationalist reaction from Mexico.303 Instead, the Mérida Initiative
allows the United States to fund, train, and equip Mexican law enforcement in
way that supports US corporate security interests and simultaneously “armors”
NAFTA by militarizing civil society. Because of the high levels of narcocorruption and human rights violations committed by state security forces, it is
also increasingly a source of brutal and systemic state-sanctioned violence.
D. Reality on the Ground: Collective Trauma and a National Crisis
“[W]hat is increasingly clear is that if this is a war,
it is being waged, at least in part, by powerful
299
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forces of the Mexican government against
poor and marginalized sectors of the Mexican people.”
—El Sicario (The Assassin)304
“They took a cloth . . . and they wrapped it around my head except
for my nose . . . later I learned that this was what they called “the
mummy” . . . They left me like this and began to do the thing with the
water again, but this time the water came in directly through my nose.
They repeated this three times. That’s when I said, ‘That’s it, I’ll
confess to whatever you want.’”
—Marcelo Laguarda Dávila, Monterrey, Nuevo León305
“We have a national emergency here,” said Mexican poet and novelist Javier
Sicilia, whose 24-year-old son was gunned down in the drug violence in
2011.306 The concepts of shock and psychological and physical trauma as
analyzed in Klein’s work307 becomes particularly salient in examining the onthe-ground reality of the drug war. In real terms, the war on drugs has directly
increased human rights abuses and has escalated the drug war to the point of
generating a collective crisis within Mexican society.308
In November 2011, Human Rights Watch published a 212-page report
documenting what many in Mexico were already acutely aware of: the abuses
committed by the Mexican authorities since the militarization of
counternarcotics operations in 2006. The report provides a damning account of
the widespread use of illegal detentions, kidnappings, forced disappearances,
and extrajudicial killings.309 These abuses represent a systemic problem—that
is, they are not isolated incidents or aberrations.310 Moreover, in Mexico, there
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is virtually no investigation into the abuses, meaning that law enforcement and
drug cartels commit them with overwhelming impunity.311
Human Rights Watch documented 170 cases of torture committed by all
levels of security forces involved in antidrug efforts: the Army; Navy; Federal
Police; and state, local, and judicial investigative police.312 Most victims were
arrested under the pretext of committing a crime, held for hours or days,
prevented from contacting family or loved ones, and tortured for information
about organized crime or for a confession regarding involvement in organized
crime.313 One woman in Tijuana reported being raped and tortured while in
custody. Officials then brought out pictures of her children and partner,
threatening to target them if she did not maintain her false confession.314 An
indigenous woman in the state of Guerrero described how plainclothes police
entered and searched her home. They interrogated her and her four sons about
a man whose name she was unfamiliar with, and then beat them with rifles.
She and one of her sons were forced into vehicles, then punched and kicked
repeatedly on the way to the police station. The officers threatened to kill her
son if he did not offer them information about a woman who had
disappeared.315 Evidence has surfaced that the United States has engaged in
training the Mexican police in torture techniques as part of the Mérida
Initiative, likely through private contractors.316 In one video, “the contractor
drags an officer through his own vomit;” another shows “a victim given shots
of water up his nose.”317
Arbitrary detention and forced disappearances have also become
widespread; detentions are never officially registered, and security forces often
deny having the victim in custody when their family comes searching for
311
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them.318 Military officials acknowledge that nearly 20,000 civilians have
disappeared between 2007 and 2010.319 For example, in June 2011, a 22-yearold taxi driver in the state of Nuevo León was stopped at a Navy checkpoint,
removed from his taxi, and put into a Navy pick-up truck.320 His father, also a
taxi driver, was there, and asked the officials why his son was being
detained.321 He was told that if his son was “not involved in anything,” he
would be brought back.322 Five months later, his family filed complaints with
both the state and federal prosecutor’s offices, but they still have no
information about their son.323 Instead of pursuing such complaints,
government officials have a practice of preemptively classifying the incidents
as levantones, referring to kidnappings carried out by an organized crime
group.324
The cartels also use torture to force confessions, and they regularly
disappear people. In October 2010, a lawyer was kidnapped from his desk at
his office.325 He soon appeared in a series of internet videos sitting handcuffed,
surrounded by men wearing black ski masks.326 With guns pointing at his head
and body, he recounted on camera his involvement with the Juárez Cartel,
stating that he and his sister, the former state attorney general, both worked for
the cartel and had organized political murders from their positions.327 His sister
says that his kidnappers tortured him as revenge against her for firing 350
police and prosecutors for corruption.328 A few days later, his body turned up,
318
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half-buried, in a rural area.329 According to El Sicario, there are several
“clandestine cemeteries” around Ciudad Juárez and the rest of the country,
some of them mass graves where the cartels bury their victims.330 Also in
October 2010, gunmen fired on three buses carrying workers coming home
from work at a manufacturing plant, leaving four dead and fourteen injured.331
Another shootout at a birthday party left fourteen youth dead.332 The local
police said the goal of these murders was to destabilize the government and
law enforcement, implying that they were committed by criminal
organizations.333
Even when the Mexican authorities target their antidrug efforts at a cartel
member or leader (as opposed to innocent victims, as described above), these
encounters often end in brutal and public displays of violence, spreading terror
among the general population.334 In December 2009, at least two hundred
Mexican troops, acting on intelligence from the United States, stormed an
upscale apartment complex in the city of Cuernavaca and killed drug lord
Arturo Beltrán Leyva335 along with other cartel members.336 The highest-level
assassination of a cartel leader yet in the drug war, the killing was lauded as “a
329
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convincing blow” to the cartels337 and a “rare success for Mexican and US
intelligence officials.”338
The execution had other consequences on the ground, however. Residents of
the apartment complex witnessed a violent military assault—they were
evacuated and held at a gymnasium in the complex while helicopters circled
low, grenades exploded, and machine guns were fired.339 The shootout was
vicious, lasting between one and two hours, and residents were left to clean up
the bloodstains.340 Afterwards, Cuernavaca was left wondering if the death
would lead to more violence, with cartel members battling to replace the boss,
or if the death would prompt a rival cartel to attack.341 A Wikileaks cable
reveals that the Mexican authorities conceded that “[a] spike [in violence] is
probably likely in the short term as inter- and intra-cartel battles are intensified
by the sudden leadership gap in one of the country’s most important cartels.”342
Fulfilling this prediction, in August 2010, four decapitated bodies were found
hanging by their ankles from a major bridge in Cuernavaca.343 Their heads
were found next to the highway along with a handwritten sign indicating that
anyone supporting a particular person in taking control of the cartel, which had
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been without a leader since Beltrán Leyva’s murder, would suffer the same
fate.344
In some ways, the Mexican authorities sent a similarly militant message in
killing Leyva: those who it confronts in the course of the drug war will be met
with violence—no formal charges will be made, no due process of law will be
awarded. The pattern of terrifying violence—torture, disappearances, and
extrajudicial killings—committed directly by the state, and documented by
Human Rights Watch, reflects nothing less than the imposition of mass trauma
by the state on its populace. Under Pinochet’s notoriously brutal regime, over
3,000 people were killed or disappeared and at least 80,000 were
imprisoned.345 In Mexico, 47,000 people have died, and the war still continues.
Analyzing the shock doctrine in the Chilean context, discussed earlier,
reveals parallels between the economic shocks implemented under Pinochet
and the physical shocks of torture and terror administered by his regime. In
Mexico, these same parallels can be identified. The militarization of Mexico’s
antinarcotics policies through the Mérida Initiative grew out of the SPP
discussions, which represented an effort to “armor NAFTA.”346 The
militarization of Mexico under the pretext of the war on drugs reflects the
heightened security concerns that have surfaced in the context of increased
transnational trade and investment. These connections suggest that the
economic shock of neoliberal restructuring under NAFTA and the
physiological shock and collective trauma of widespread violence and
militarization since Calderón’s war began are related.
Just as Pinochet once faced charges in international courts for the abuses
committed by his regime,347 Mexican activists and human rights lawyer Netzai
344
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Sandoval filed a complaint in November 2011 with the International Criminal
Court in The Hague, alleging the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity by both Mexican security forces and drug cartel leaders.348 While
this type of legal advocacy is invaluable, examining Mexico’s war on drugs
through the lens of the shock doctrine suggests that the broader framework of
neoliberalism and the context of socioeconomic disparities should also be
challenged, as the connections between these ostensibly separate spheres—
economic policy and political terror—become clearer.

VI. CONCLUSION
“We’re here to tell ourselves and them that we will not turn this
pain in our souls, in our bodies, in[to] hate nor in[to] more
violence, but in[to] a vehicle to help us restore love, peace,
justice, dignity and the stuttering democracy that we’re losing,
[…] that we still believe that it’s possible to rescue and
reconstruct the social fabric of our peoples, neighborhoods and
cities.”
—Javier Sicilia, speaking in Mexico City, May 2011349
In May 2011, more than 100,000 people, led by Sicilia after his son was
killed by gunmen, marched from Cuernavaca to Mexico City, demanding an
end to the war on drugs in Mexico.350 These mobilization efforts are part of
breaking the silence around US-led antidrug laws and policies, and it is time
for our domestic legal and socio-political discourses to follow suit. “[O]nce the
mechanics of the shock doctrine are deeply and collectively understood,” Klein
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writes, entire communities become “shock resistant.”351 Ultimately, this article
aims to demonstrate the need to develop a deeper understanding of the war on
drugs and, by extension, the need for broad demands in order to advance
meaningful social change.
In sum, I suggest here that the political logic of Mexico’s war on drugs is a
product of neoliberalism—the grueling socio-economic stratification created
and enforced through austerity measures, deregulation, privatization, and freetrade agreements—and the militarized control that represses dissent in the face
of deepening disparities. In order to effect change, our critique must move
beyond the parameters of the US and Mexican government’s stated antidrug
policy objectives. Criticizing the war on drugs for its failure to eradicate drug
trafficking352 fails to account for the socio-economic and political contexts
within which this program was developed and legitimated.
In writing about the human rights violations committed by Pinochet’s
government, Orlando Latelier, wrote that the “system of institutionalized
brutality, the drastic control and suppression of every form of meaningful
dissent is discussed (and often condemned) as a phenomenon only indirectly
linked, or indeed entirely unrelated, to the classical unrestrained ‘free market’
policies that have been enforced by the military junta.353 The “entirely
unrelated” ideology cleans the economic regime of its crimes—while the
torture and human rights abuses are condemned, the economic free-market
policies are applauded,354 operating on the presumption that the two constitute
separate dynamics. This article represents a call for the need to depart from the
“entirely unrelated” ideology.
The war on drugs in Mexico is not solely about human rights violations, nor
is it just about narco-corruption or the arms trade. Instead, militarization allows
351
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the Mexican authorities to target groups that are working to develop
alternatives to the predominant socio-economic channels under the pretext of
antidrug actions. The profound levels of violence and the climate of fear
produced by the war on drugs in Mexico act as mechanisms that thwart the
democratic participation of civil society. The human rights abuses and
widespread state-sanctioned violence committed via the war on drugs in
Mexico can be seen as an effective and profitable method (for some) of
protecting US-led neoliberalism.
The urgency of the situation points to the need for building an analysis that
understands and challenges the complexities of neoliberalism, government
antidrug policy, immigration enforcement, and state-sanctioned violence.
Social Justice movements must continue seeking alternatives to free-market
economic policies and neoliberal narratives and to demand an end to all forms
of state-sanctioned violence—these arenas form part of our resistance to the
war on drugs, both in the United States and in Mexico. An inquiry into the war
on drugs that is devoid of a critique on these related matters risks “sacrific[ing]
the broad goals that might connect a new social movement strong and
ambitious enough to take on inequalities that single-issue politics only ever
ameliorate, but never reverse.”355
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